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Until 1987 air transport in the European Community was rigidly controlled by 
Member State governments, when the European Commission's third attempt to 
transfer competence for this industry to the European arena was successful. As 
traced in this paper, the transition did not result solely from intergovernmental 
bargaining, neither did the package of reforms eventually agreed by the Council 
of Ministers reflect domestic policy preferences. Instead the transfer of 
competence was largely caused by other mechanisms outsideThe direct control of 
Member State governments. Increases in intra-EC activity'provoked demands for 
a Euro-level policy from the societal actors most adversely affected by 
maintaining the status quo. Societal actors - major businesses, consumers, 
potential new entrants - formed into transnational groups, forged alliances with 
the European Commission and pressurised for change. Confirmation by the 
European Court that the competition rules applied to this sector became another 
force_jor change. Additionally, the Commission exercised its powers under 
Article 89 to investigate anti-competitive practices by state-owned airlines. This 
(suggests that theories stressing the pivotal power of Member State governments 
to control European policy processes may not be appropriate to explain changes 
in this particular sector; instead a modified form of neo-functionalism appears to 
be more consistent with transfer of competence to the Community.
I am grateful to Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, Fritz Scharpf and Alec Stone Sweet for reading this 






















































































































































































Within the last decade control of the European Community (EC)1 air transport 
sector has been transferred from Member State governments to the European 
arena. Although specific provisions for transport were made in the Treaty of 
Rome, the onus to act was negated by the inclusion of an Article 84 (1) which 
limited the policy remit to transport by rail, road and inland waterways. However, 
currently, liberalization is chiefly driven at the level of the EC. Member State 
governments have transferred their competencies to European authority. 
Consequently in many cases the licensed state-owned monopoly airlines have 
been exposed to commercial competitive pressures for the first time. Measures 
proposed by the Commission and eventually agreed by the Council of Ministers 
have eroded barriers to market entry. Why was this effort successful and the 
previous attempts to reform futile? In order to answer these questions this paper 
traces the policy process that led to the eventual approval of a package of 
liberalising measures by the Council in December 1987, analyses the 
determinants for change and relates the findings to two theories of integration: 
intergovemmentalism and modified neo-functionalism.
The paper has the following sections:
Section one: the relevant theoretical backdrop to this study.
Section two: an analysis of why international air transport has 
historically been so highly regulated and why the industry within the 
EC remained deadlocked against change for so long.
Section three: an examination of the causal measures - increases of 
transnational activity and new court rulings - which finally made the 
Member States recognise the costs of continuing to resist.
Section four: an examination of the policy process, through an 
analysis of how European institutions responded to the pressures for 
change and^’forced" the Council to adopt a package of liberalisation 
measures. —
Section five: conclusions.
'Although the term "European Union" has been in use since the Maastricht Treaty, 1992, 
"European Community" (EC) is used throughout this paper as it remains the term mostly 



























































































Section One: Theoretical Backdrop
Two rival theories currently dominate the debate about how integration happens: 
intergovemmentalism and neo-functionalism. For the purpose of this paper, the 
theoretical debate focuses on one question:
"what accounts for the transference o f authority to govern from the 
national level to the European arena?"
More specifically, how can the "Europeanization" of air transport be explained?
Intergovemmentalist approaches assert that states tend to be the dominant 
influence and control the rate of the integration process. The EC provides the 
interstate bargaining arena which reflects domestic political preferences. 
Supranational organisations, such as the European Commission and the European 
Court of Justice (ECJ) merely help the Member States realise their objectives. 
They pursue the integrative agendas of the dominant states or are reined in when 
they pursue their own objectives. Intergovemmentalists2 would therefore not 
expect supranational institutions to play any independent or pivotal role in 
transferring control of air transport policy from the Member States to the EC. The 
findings of this empirical investigation challenge the intergovemmentalist 
perspective.
The process of air transport integration is better explained by a slightly revised 
form of neo-functionalism3, what the authors refer to as "modified neo- 
fiinctionalist" theory (Caporaso and Stone Sweet, 1997; Sandholtz and Stone 
Sweet, 1997; Sandholtz 1997; and Stone Sweet 1997 forthcoming). This theory 
suggests that the causal mechanism is quite simple: increasing levels of cross- 
border transactions and communications by societal actors will increase the need 
or social demand for European-level rules and coordination. For these societal 
actors the lack of European rules and coordination will eventually be seen as an 
obstacle to the pursuit of their interests. Thus, the theory predicts that as the 
involvement of non-state actors in cross-border exchanges increases, so does the 
societal demand for integration. To the extent that supranational institutions meet 
the demands of these societal actors, integration is advanced and it can justly be 
said that "transactors" are a main causal force driving the integration process.
2See Hoffman, 1966; Moravcsik, 1991, 1993; Garrett, 1992 and Kilroy, 1996 as representative 
of the literature on intergovemmentalism.
3 See Haas, 1958; Lindberg, 1963; Lindberg and Scheingold, 1970; and Nye, 1968 as 




























































































Modified neo-functionalism does not completely ignore the role of Member State 
governments. It recognises that they have powerful material and non-material 
resources and diverse preferences and that they have a role to play in the policy 
process, but it does not accept that this provides a complete explanation of the 
outcomes. The integration process itself generates rules and organisational 
capacities which place both political and institutional constraints on governments, 
whilst simultaneously giving greater influence to a variety of non-state actors with 
a stake in the development of intra-EC transactions. Thus, although, inter-state 
bargaining plays an essential part in the process, the power of the Member States 
is curtailed by factors outside their control. In some instances, even a majority of 
the Member States have to accept decisions outside their vector of preferred 
outcomes.
Liberalisation of air transport provides a context to test these hypotheses. 
Although a majority of Member State governments strongly opposed transferring 
national competence to the EC, the Commission nevertheless succeeded in
Csecuring the adoption of a package of liberalising measures. It seems that intergovernmental bargaining alone cannot account for the substance or timing of this change. An alternative approach, modified neo-functionalism will be employed tp^xamine how these changes occurred. In this case the societal actors 
will be those groups who&e__prosperity is dependent upon cross-border 
communications and exchange within Europe: majoFBusiness users; consumers; 
non-schedutetf airlines; and potential new entrants. The theory assumes that these 
transactors will exploit any opportunity which the European institutions can 
provide to achieve their goals. The framework adopted specifically focuses 
attention on the following areas:
(i) How rising levels of cross border exchange led business and consumer 
groups to demand policy integration at European level;
(ii) How the European Commission worked with these groups to fulfil their 
interests;
(iii) How judgements by the European Court of Justice reinforced these 
pressures;
(iv) How Member State governments recognised that continued reluctance to 





























































































The following examination of the air transport policy process in the EC will show 
to what extent this particular variant of neo-functionalism explains the changes 
which occurred.
Section Two: International regulation of Air Transport
The First Sixty Years
Historically, all modes of transport have experienced government regulation but 
the aviation industry has been more regulated than any other (Lissitzyn, 1968, p. 
12). Regulation of international aviation began in 1919 when the International Air 
Convention gave states rights over the airspace above their territory. 
Governments immediately started controlling their own airspace and negotiating 
bilateral agreementsjis the need arose (see Sawers, 1987; Button and Swann, 
1991; and Doganis, 1991 for a full discussion on the reasons for international 
regulation).
The Chicago Convention of 1944 confirmed the principle of national sovereignty 
over airspace and in consequence the pre-war system of bilateralism became also 
the pattern for the post-war world (O’Reilly, 1993, p ll). Highly protectionist 
bilateral agreements (Doganis, 1991, p. 29) resulted in the "virtual elimination of 
competition" (House of Lords, 1980, p. 25).
Thus, air transport has been dominated by state regulation from its inception. 
Competition between airlines operating scheduled services has largely been 
prevented, with competition restricted to non-scheduled services. The industry 
has been controlled by regulators and not by airline management. This was the 
case in the USA until 1978 when the Administration deregulated its domestic air 
transport sector and in the European Community until the industry was liberalised 
by a series of measures in the period between 1986 and 1992. (See Caves, 1962; 
Levine, 1965; Jordan, 1970; Douglas and Miller, 1974; Civil Aeronautics Board 
Report, 1975; US DOT, 1978, Doc 28848; Kahn, 1978; Stenier, 1983; Dempsey, 
1988; Giallereto, 1988; O'Reilly, 1995 for full discussion of causes and 





























































































Domestic deregulation in the United States had little immediate impact in the EC. 
Although transport was one of only two sectors of the economy given its own 
Title in the Treaty of Rome, Article 84(2) provided that:
The Council may, acting unanimously, decide whether and to what extent and by what 
procedure appropriate provisions may be laid down for sea and air transport. (Article 
84 (2) Treaty of Rome)
Thus, the Treaty appeared to leave the whole area of air transport policy-making 
to the discretion of the Council, an interpretation reinforced later by the specific 
exclusion of, aviation and shipping from the provisions of the regulation (17/62) 
giving effect to the Treaty's competition rules.
This fostered inaction as all the Community flag-carriers were still^state-owned 
and functioned largely as arT arm of government) Political and social interests 
predominated over commercIaFconsiderations: airlines were often obliged to 
serve non-profitable routes; to purchase locally manufactured aircraft regardless 
of their suitability; and to adopt government employment policies (for example 
see the Irish Aviation Policy, 1994). Most, if not all, the scheduled carriers 
frequently made heavy losses - amounting, for instance, to $700 million in 1981 
(CEC, 1984, p. 11) - and "the desire to avoid any increase in these deficits 
increase[d] the reluctance o f governments to expose their airlines to further 
competition" (CEC, 1984, p. 22). Thus, "the general pattern was one of 
protectionism, collusion and anti-competitive practice [and it was often] difficult 
to tell where the management of the airline ended and the state began" (Kassim, 
1996, pp. 113-4).
Air transport was subject to international regulation which was another barrier to 
change. The Chicago Convention had established an International Civil Aviation 
Organisation (ICAO) as a specialised agency of the United Nations to define 
standards and rules for the industry worldwide. At the regional level an 
intergovernmental organisation, the European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC), 
also exercised important regulatory functions, particularly in technical matters. 
Finally, certain activities carried out by the International Air Transport 
Association (IATA), notably tariff coordinationând interline agreements, were an 
additional obstacle to EC involvement. As the Commission itself recognised in 
1979, ----  ~~ ----
"the caution o f governments and industries over initiating new measures without prior 





























































































First Challenges to the Status Quo
The first, although indirect, challenge to the status quo came from the ruling of 
the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in the French Merchant Seamen case (EC 
Commission v France, Case 167/73).
Defending a provision in its Code du Travail Maritime that "such proportion of 
the crew o f a ship as is laid down by order o f the Minister for the Merchant 
Fleet must be French nationals", France had argued that since Article 84 (2) of 
the Treaty made it clear that the preceding provisions for rail; road and inland 
waterways did not apply to maritime transport, a fortiori it could be taken that the 
general provisions of the Treaty did not apply either. Rejecting this argument, the 
Court stated that the general rules of the Treaty applied to all economic activities 
in the Community except where there was specific provision to the contrary. 
Thus, whilst Article 84(2) did indeed make special provision for air and sea 
transport, these sectors remained subject to the general rules on the same basis as 
the other modes of transport.
Although not directly responsible, the "spill over" from this judgement prompted 
the Council of Ministers in June 1977 to establish an air transport working party 
to "identify those areas o f government activity which, with advantage, could be
! examined at Community level" (CEC, 1979, p. 8). In 1978 the Council approved a list of nine priority areas but it is significant that of these nine, only three - competition, right of establishment, and possible improvements to inter-regional ^ services - had any direct bearing on the economic regulation of the industry.
The Commission's Initiatives - The First Memorandum
Stimulated by the Council's activity and the first results of domestic deregulation 
in the United States the Commission issued a memorandum in July 1979 entitled 
"Air Transport: a Community Approach" (CEC, 1979). The memorandum was 
designed to provoke debate among the Community institutions and focused on the 
broad objectives of an air transport policy: a total network unhampered by 
national barriers; financial soundness for airlines; protection for the interests of 
airline workers; and "improvements in conditions of life for the general public 
and respect for the wider interests of our economies and societies" (CEC, 1979, 
p. 37).
Realising that change needed to be gradual the Commission outlined a limited 
number of actions which at Community level would benefit users and the sector 





























































































removal of some restrictions on the introduction of new scheduled 
services, particularly between regional airports;
offering users a broader range of fares;
protection of passengers for overbooking;
establishing criteria for the granting of state-aids; and
l;
application of the competition rules to air transport.
Generally, the response to the proposals in the memorandum was Begati^. The 
European Parliament accepted that there was room for improvement in 
Community air transport but warned that reform should not interfere with the 
basic structure of the industry. The Association of European Airlines (AEA) 
suggested that the current system was adequate. Employee organisations "felt that 
the memorandum had paid insufficient attention to the social problems of the 
industry" (CEC, 1984, p. 7). The Council of Ministers’ only reaction was to invite 
the Commission to focus its attention on a proposal for frontier crossing inter­
regional services (See CEC, 1984, pp. 3-8 for a fuller account of reactions to the 
memorandum).
Despite this response, the Commission produced three follow-up proposals to the 
Council. Two of these, a draft directive on tariffs and a draft regulation on 
application of the competition rules to air transport, were rejected by the Council. 
The third, made in response to the Council’s request, was a draft regulation 
regarding inter-regional services.! The aim of this proposal was simply to remove 
these services from the bilateral structure and thus give airlines new opportunity 
to operate outside the trunk routes4.
The Council, content with the status quo, did not agree to the proposal as 
presented by the Commission. Instead, when the Council finally adopted 
legislation nearly three years later it was in the form of a directive (see Directive 
83/416/EEC) and the substance was so diluted that "it is questionable how much 
effect it will have in its modified version" (CEC, 1984, p. 15).
Specifically, the Council limited the scope of the directive to services between 
regional airports whereas the Commission had proposed that it extend also to 
services from the regions to major, Category 1 airports (see Appendix A for the
vJ^Trlink routes are the main routes between city pairs and were invariably operated by the flag- 




























































































classification of EC airports). As Table 1 showsy')0iis change restricted its 
coverage to routes which carried less-"than 3 per cent of intra-Community 
scheduled traffic, as compared with 37 per cent in the Commission's proposal. 
Moreover, the liberalised services were to be operated by aircraft with no more 
than 70 seats, not by aircraft with up to 130 seats as proposed, and the minimum 
route distance was fixed at 400, not 200, kilometres. Further, the grounds on 
which a Member State could refuse to license a new service were extended by the 
Council. Additionally, the Council refused to adopt provisions which would have 
made it easier for airlines to obtain a licence from their own authorities. Thus the 
impact of the directive on competition on these routes was negligible.
In essence the status quo was unaffected: state-owned airlines continued to 
dominate the industry, barriers to entering the market remained and competition 
was virtually non-existent. Nevertheless, adoption of the directive was significant 
in that it was the first measure concerning air transport that the Council adopted 
with Article 84(2) as its legal base. It was against this background that the 
Commission presented its Second Memorandum on Civil Aviation in 1984 (CEC, 
1984). What the Memorandum proposed and how Member State governments 




























































































Section Three: Pressures for Change
Although the entrenched interests of Member States and of the airlines which 
they owned had largely succeeded in preserving the status quo into the mid- 
1980s, pressure for change from a variety of sources had been gradually growing. 
Business and commercial lobbies; air transport user groups; and some sectors of 
the industry itself began to demand policy reform. Additionally, European Court 
of Justice (ECJ) decisions reinforced these pressures. This section identifies the 
motives of the societal actors involved and shows how they pursued their 
interests. It also examines two major ECJ judgements and the impact they made 
on the policy process.
Increasing Transnational Activity and Demands
Modified neo-functionalist theory argues that societal actors engaged in cross- 
border transactions are the primary drivers of integration. This theory partially 
redeploys the combined insights of Deutsch and Haas. Deutsch (1964) views the 
"societal exchange" as a critical factor in driving the integration process, whilst 
Haas (1958) argues that politics are driven by interest groups which need 
integration in order to improve their situation. Both recognise that the lack of 
organisation at levels higher than those provided by the State will be seen as a 
barrier to the creation of wealth. Put in its simplest form, as intra-EC activity 
increases so will a demand for change from those societal actors most adversely 
affected by state-centric control of the sector. Therefore, in this case study, it is 
hypothesised that an increase in the level of intra-EC air traffic will provoke 
demands from those societal actors whose prosperity is most dependent upon 
intra-EC activity.
Figures 1 and 2 trace the parallel growth of intra-EC commercial activity and of 
air travel. This growth in air travel was partly in response to the increase in 
transnational activity created by the drive towards a single European market but 
also partly the means by which this increased activity was achieved. Yet for many 
transactors the licensed monopolies operated by the state-owned airlines were too 
costly and inadequate for their needs. They demanded a more efficient and 
economic air transport system and turned to the Community to provide it.
Thus, any explanation of the movement from rigid bilateralism to European rule- 
making must start from an analysis of why the state-centric regime in place failed 





























































































The opportunities presented by the breakdown of barriers to intra-Community 
trade created a demand which the state-centric airline system was quite unable to 
meet, for the following reasons. First, services provided on existing routes were 
inefficient and costly. Secondly, airlines were prevented from meeting demands 
for new services by the restrictions in the bilateral inter-govemmental 
agreements. The frustrations'df TTrajoi businèss users found expression both at 
national and European level, with the International Chamber of Commerce 
arguing strongly for a policy of liberalisation and the Roundtable of European 
Industrialists saying that an efficient air transport system was essential for 
survival in an internationally competitive environment (European Roundtable of 








































































































Passenger and Cargo Traffic Carried by Flag-Carriers on Intra-EC Routes 1977-1991
Figure 1





2 0 0 0 0
Intra-European Passenger Traffic=Revenue Passengers Carried (Thousands) 
Intra-European Freight Traffic=Revenue Freight Tonnes (Millions)
The graph uses data for the nine flag-carriers of the EC, it does not include Greece, Portugal 
and Spain. Data from









































































































Relationship Between Trade, Passenger and Cargo Traffic Carried by Flag-Carriers on 
Intra-EC Routes, 1977-1991
Figure 2
o Intra-European Trade a Intra-European Freight
o Intra-European Passengers
Intra-European Passenger Traffic=Revenue Passengers Carried (Thousands) 
Intra-European Freight Traffic=Revenue Freight Tonnes (Millions)
The graph uses data for the nine flag-carriers of the EC, it does not include Greece, Portugal and Spain. 
Data from Association of European Airlines Statistical Yearbooks: 1977-1991..Trade data are from 





























































































Groups specifically concerned with the interests of air passengers were slower to 
organise inEurope than in the United States, although one had been established in 
the UK as early as 1973, and others followed in Denmark in 1979, in Ireland and 
Italy in 1982, and in France and Belgium in 1983. More significant than these 
individual developments, however, was the creation in 1982 - largely at the 
Commission's instigation - of a Federation of Air Transport User Representatives 
(FATUREC). By 1984 FATUREC had constituents in all Member States and was 
holding regular consultations with the Commission's Directorate General for 
Transport.
At the non-specialist level, other trans-national consumer organisations were also 
becoming active. The European Bureau of Consumer Unions (BEUC) adopted 
"an active and militant role in Community decisions on air transport" 
(Wheatcroft and Lipman, 1986, p. 74) and in 1985 issued a report urging a 
multiple designation of airlines on all routes, an end to tariff consultations 
between airlines and their revenue pooling arrangements, and immediate 
application of the Treaty's competition rules. The UK-based Consumers in the 
European Community Group (CECG) was similarly critical both of the existing 
regime and the Commission's cautious response.
A commercial organisation, the International Airline Passengers Association, also 
adopted a militant stand as part of its "Freedom of the Skies" programme and in 
1985 created a non-profit foundation to promote passengers' interests in the 
decision making process. This International Foundation of Airlines Passengers' 
Associations (IFAPA) campaigned vigorously for an increased choice of airlines, 
products, frequencies and fares.
Airlines
The Association of Independent Air Carriers in the European Community (ACE), 
representing fourteen privately owned carriers from six Member States, were 
even more insistent in their demands than the consumer organisations. Prevented 
by bilateral agreements from operating scheduled services they argued that 
government involvement in the running of the industry was no longer warranted: 
"the industry [should] be allowed to evolve commercially in step with the 
changing pattern o f demand for air transport services and ...governments 
[should] refrain from obstructing that natural process" (House of Lords 1985, p. 
270). They strongly criticised the Commission for its continual failure to 
implement the competition rules, making the telling point that the offending 




























































































each and every one "with a vested interest in the airline business" (House of 
Lords 1985, p. 267).
The few scheduled carriers who were already operating in a liberalised 
environment, notably British Caledonian and British Midland, shared these views. 
The former argued that "it is absurd and unacceptable for European countries to 
call for and obtain increased freedom and competition in manufacturing and 
other industries while maintaining restrictive, protectionist postures towards 
civil aviation" (House of Lords 1985, p. 85). British Midland spoke of its 
satisfaction that the "groundswell of resentment and frustration at the lack of 
competition is beginning to impress itself on governments, regulators and, of 
course, on the EC itself' and it too appealed to the Commission to "enshrine the 
legal principles required for a genuinely free market" (Bishop, 1993 p. 1).
Failure of the Existing System
For each of these groups of societal actors, the regulated air transport system was 
inadequate. In every instance, it failed to meet their needs. The protectionist 
system meant that incumbent airlines were unable to adjust to the changing needs 
of transactors who needed an efficient air transport system to develop markets of 
European scale. Potential new entrants were excluded from entering the market 
altogether and charter airlines could not compete on a head-to-head basis with 
scheduled airlines for business traffic. Above all, a system which allowed neither 
choice nor competition meant that all users had to pay a high price for the 
industry's inefficiency. All these transactors looked to the Community for action 
and the Commission was ultimately able to utilise their demands to promote its 
own proposals.
European Court of Justice Decisions as a Causal Force
Article 84 (2) of the Treaty left it to the Council to
decide whether, to what extent and by what procedure appropriate provisions 
may be laid down fo r  sea and air transport
and thus created a legal ambiguity that was to have far-reaching consequences for 
the application and development of EC law in this field (Dagtoglou 1994, pp. 42- 
5). This ambiguity was eventually resolved in a series of rulings by the European 
Court which played a decisive part in the integration process. As noted above, the 
Court had ruled in 1974, in the French Merchant Seamen case, that whilst Article 
84 (2) made special provisions for air and sea transport these sectors were 




























































































branches of Community activity. This ruling was subsequently confirmed and 
developed in two further cases.
The first was the Common Transport Policy case (European Parliament v EC 
Council, Case 13/83) [1986] 1 CMLR). Parliament had sought a declaration that 
the Council had failed to lay down the principles of the common transport policy 
prescribed by the Treaty. Although the Court found that the Council was in 
breach of its obligations to ensure freedom to provide services, it dismissed the 
rest of the application, saying that under the system laid down, by the Treaty it 
was for the Council to determine
...the aims o f and means for implementing a common transport policy. As part of 
lthis] obligation ... the Council is required to make all the decisions necessary for the 
gradual introduction o f such a policy, but the substance o f those decisions is not 
determined by the Treaty. ..It is also for the Council to determine what priorities are to 
be observed in harmonising the laws and administrative practices in the sector and to 
decide what matters such harmonisation must cover. In that respect the Treaty gives 
the Council a discretion ([1986] 1 CMLR 138 pp.202-3).
The Court made no specific reference in its judgement to air transport. However, 
the Advocate General had stated in his opinion that he agreed "with the applicant 
and the Commission that the obligation to adopt a common transport policy 
extends not only to transport by rail, road and inland waterway but also, as a 
matter o f principle, to sea and air transport... ". Prima facie it might be thought 
from the wording of Article 84 that the Council had complete discretion in these 
matters but in his view "it has a discretion only as to whether and how far it 
wishes to derogate in respect o f these two modes of transport from the 
provisions [for rail, road and inland waterways]" ([1986] 1CMLR 138, p. 170). It 
was reasonably inferred from the Court's silence on this point that it was of the 
same view.
The second case, usually known as the Nouvelles Frontières case (Ministère 
public v Lucas Asjes and others, Cases 209-213/84 (1986), arose from criminal 
proceedings brought in France against a number of airlines and travel agencies. 
The accused were charged with infringements of the Civil Aviation Code (Code 
de l'Aviation Civile) for selling tickets at tariffs which had not been approved by 
the French Minister of Civil Aviation and which undercut tariffs which had been 
so approved. The Paris criminal court (Tribunal de Police) submitted the fde to 
the Court, under Article 177 of the Treaty, for a preliminary ruling on whether the 
relevant sections of the Civil Aviation Code were in conformity with Community 
law, commenting inter alia that "those provisions, which call for a concerted 
practice between airlines, undoubtedly have as their effect the prevention, 




























































































3CMLR 173, p. 179). They were therefore, in its view, incompatible with Article 
85 of the Treaty.
As the Advocate General stated in his opinion, the central issue raised by the case 
was "whether the competition rules in the EEC Treaty areixipplicaBle) to the 
fixing of the tariffs for Community and international air travel" ([1986] 3CMLR, 
p. 177). In his view "the question o f the applicability o f the general rules of the 
treaty to sea and air transport might well have been thought to be settled" by the 
French Merchant Seamen judgement ([1986] 3CMLR 173 p. 196). Two airlines 
(Air France and KLM) had nevertheless argued against such a conclusion, 
claiming that the only general rules were in Part Two of the Treaty (concerning 
the Foundations of the Community) whereas the competition rules were contained 
in Part Three (Policy of the Community). However, the Advocate General stated 
"th a fth f entire Trefflyy, insofar as it is relevant, is, with the exception o f the 
'special proviStons^of the Title relating to air transport', applicable to air 
transport" ([ 1986] 3 CMLR 173, p. 197).
Concurring with this opinion, the Court found that by requiring airlines to agree 
tariffs between themselves before submitting them for approval, the French
government vva.s in breach of Article 5 of the Treaty (which requTresTlemB5r 
States to "abstain from any measure which could jeopardise the attainment of 
the objectives o f the Treaty"). But it also declared"that in the absence of any 
regulation applying the competition--nile»s.-.ta._air^transport, the only way of 
enforcing these rules was by idlaational authority'H'thp Tribunal de Police was 
not such an authority) acting under Article 88 of the Treaty or by the Commission 
acting under Article 89.
Implications of the Court's Judgements
Superficially, the Court's judgement in the Nouvelles Frontières case appeared to 
bring nothing new to consideration of the Commission's Second Memorandum. It 
confirmed that the general rules of the Treaty applied to air transport but it added 
nothing to the ruling in the Common Transport Policy case that it was for the 
Council to decide "what priorities are to be observed in harmonising the laws 
and administrative practices in the sector and to decide what matters such 
harmonisation must cover" ([1986] 1 CMLR 138, p. 203).
The real significance of the judgement lay, however, in its making explicit what 
had until then been merely a distant threat, that the Commission might make use 
of its powers under Article 89 to investigate cases of suspected infringements of 
Articles 85 and 86 and propose "appropriate measures" to bring any such 




























































































with a stark choice: becoming involved in the creation of a Community air 
transport policy or preserving their authority under constant threat of legal action 
and market chaos. As the Commission argued in the Second Memorandum, this 
was just what its proposals were designed to avoid.
Section Four: The Policy Process5
This section of the paper traces how air transport policy transferred from Member 
State governments control to EC authority: it outlines the proposals made by the 
Commission in the Second Memorandum; analyses the reactions of Member State 
governments and their preferences regarding these proposals; shows how 
supranational institutions - the Commission and the ECJ - exploited EC rules and 
the increase in transnational activity to forward the process of integration; and it 
examines the final policy outcomes.
The Commission's Second Memorandum
A majority of Member States governments were still strongly opposed to any 
reform of the air transport industry when the Commission made a fresh attempt in 
1984 to reopen debate on a Community air transport policy. The "Civil Aviation 
Memorandum No. 2" (CEC, 1984) presented to the Council in March 1984 
outlined a number of reasons for the initiative:
an increase in consumer criticism of the existing regime had 
greatly increased since publications of its first memorandum 
(CEC, 1984,b p. 1);
the air transport sector had been in a severe recession for a 
number of years, thus causing airlines to question whether the 
present arrangements were in their long-term interests either 
(CEC, 1984, p. 9);
developments in the United States since deregulation in 1978 
had given consumers greater choice and created an increase in 
public satisfaction with the system (CEC, 1984, p. 12);
there were growing doubts as to whether "the present system is 
compatible with the Treaty o f Rome" (CEC, 1984, p. 1).
5I am indebted to civil servants in a number of Member States and to Commission officials 
involved in the negotiations for much of the material in this section. The interviews were 
conducted between October 1996 and January 1997. There is no published source material on 




























































































The Commission recognised that "American-style deregulation would not work 
in the present European context" (CEC, 1984, p. i). The US air transport industry 
differed in many respects from that of the EC: the United States were a large and 
unified market reserved to US carriers and it was American government policy to 
end governmental intervention in the market and to accept its social and 
economic effects. Furthermore, the United States had twenty major carriers, all 
operating on a commercial basis and "the US Government can take a relaxed 
view on the fate o f any one o f them" (CEC, 1984, p. 27). By contrast, in the EC 
the major airlines (the flag-carriers) were all owned, financed or otherwise 
supported by their governments and "most, if not all, Member States would 
regard it as unthinkable that their airline should go out of business" (CEC, 
1984, p. 22). The Commission accordingly proposed an evolutionary approach, 
maintaining - at least for the time being - the bilateral structure of the existing 
regime but progressively introducing changes to make the system "more flexible 
and more competitive in order to increase airline efficiency, allow the efficient 
and innovative airline to benefit, encourage expansion and thus employment, 
and better meet consumer needs" (CEC, 1984, p. i).
Thus, the Commission made four proposals6, which it insisted should be adopted 
and implemented as a package. The measures were concerned with:
the capacity and revenue sharing rules in bilateral 
agreements between Member States;
fares for scheduled air transport between Member 
States;
the application of the competition rules to EC airlines;
the Commission's powers to grant block exemptions 
from these rules for certain categories of inter-airline 
cooperation.
Table 2 below summarises the attitudes of the principal actors to these proposals.
6The memorandum made no proposals on Member States' relations with third countries nor on 





























































































The Council's first reaction to the second Memorandum was to charge a High 
Level Working Group, made up of Member States' Directors General of civil 
aviation and representatives of the Commission, with the task of assessing the 
Commission's various proposals.
In the interval since publication of the Commission's first memorandum there had 
been a marked shift in the position of the UK government, following the election 
in 1979 of a Conservative administration committed to a massive programme of 
privatisation and to "exposing former state-owned companies" more fully to the 
disciplines and opportunities of the market (Thatcher, 1983). A- similar shift had 
also occurred in the Netherlands. These two governments thus considered that the 




























































































Table 2: Actors and Preferences regarding Regulatory Reform of EC Air Transport 
(1984)
ACTOR PREFERENCES
ACTORS Maintain status quo Regulatory
Reform
I European Commission X
"Liberal" MS UK, Netherlands
"Illiberal" MS (a> B, D, Dk, F, Gr, Irl, I, L, P, S
State-owned airlines^) AF, AZ, El, IB, LH, LG, OA, SN, SK, TAP BA














(Source: Compiled by the author using material from submissions made to DG VII and various
published sources)
(a) B=Belgium, D=Federal Republic of Germany, Dk=Denmark, F=France, 
Gr=Greece, Irl=Ireland, I=ltaly, L=Luxembourg
(b) AF=Air France, AZ=AlitaIia, BA=British Airways, EI=Aer Lingus, IB=Iberia, 
LH=Lufthansa, LG=Luxair, 0A=01ympic, SN=Sabena, SK=SAS, TP=TAP-Air 
Portugal
(c) BC=British Caledonian, BM=British Midland, VA=Virgin Atlantic
(d) ACE=Association of Independent Air Carriers in the European Community
(e) CC=National Chambers of Commerce, ICC=Intemational Chamber of 
Commerce, REI=Roundtable of European Industrialists
(0 FATUREC=Federation of Air Transport User Representatives in the European 
Community, BEUC=European Bureau of Consumer Unions, 
CECG=Consumers in EC Group, IFAPA=Intemational Airline Passengers 
Association




























































































The other eight Member State governments thought they had gone too far "and of 
these five or six thought that we had gone far too far" (Steele, 1985 p. 133). The 
High Level Working Group met eight times during the Irish Presidency in the 
second half of 1984 but was unable to bridge this gap. Consequently, its report 
consisted of little more than a restatement of existing positions together with a set 
of guidelines for future action which for the most part merely reflected majority 
views.
Meanwhile, the UK, whose intra-EC passenger traffic activity had increased the 
most since 1979 (See Table 3 below) had become increasingly dissatisfied with 
the obstacles to any movement at Community level. It therefore embarked on 
negotiations to liberalise its bilateral agreements with those few other Member 
States thought likely to gain from a "Europeanized" air transport system. The 
breakthrough negotiation was signed with the Netherlands and came into force on 
1 July 1984. It provided for any airline in either country to operate between the 
two without the need to seek government approval, whilst regulation of the 
frequency and capacity of services to be offered and of the fares to be charged 
was substantially relaxed. There followed a series of similar agreements, with 
Ireland, Belgium and Germany. This strategy was "encouraged and supported" 
(interview with a senior Commission official) by the Commission as they 
recognised it as one means of opening up the whole Community market without 
the formal agreement of the Council of Ministers. There is no doubt either that the 
UK also had the rather ambitious objective of using these agreements to drive 
forward the negotiations at Community level. Nevertheless, it was only during the 





























































































Table 3: Flag carrier airlines' passenger and freight traffic increases from 1979-1987
Flag Carrier Passenger Increases % Freight Increases %
Aer Lingus/Ireland 3.28 -3.45
Air France/France 17.41 18.74
Alitalia/Italy 12.56 19.15








I TAP Air Portugal/Portugal 2.57 5.83
(Source: Complied by author using data from AEA Statistical Yearbooks, 1979 
and 1988.
n/a Data not available.
Although recognising the significance of the pressures driving the integration 
process, credit must be given to the tactical skills deployed by this Presidency 
and the following UK Presidency in forwarding the Commission's argument and 
achieving the ultimate agreement. The Dutch did not get agreement on specific 
proposals but did succeed in incorporating the following paragraph into the 
conclusions of the European Council held at the Hague on 26-27 June 1986:
The European Council concluded that the Council o f Ministers (Transport) should 
make a further effort to overcome the difficulties which have recently appeared in 
relation to the liberalisation and harmonisation o f land, sea and air transport, in light 
o f the relevant judgements o f the European Court o f Justice. With regard to air 
transport, the Council o f Ministers should without delay adopt the appropriate 
decisions on air tariffs, capacity and access to markets, in accordance with the rules 




























































































Whilst some Heads of State and Government may not have realised the extent to 
which this commitment conflicted with their existing policy positions, it provided 
the United Kingdom with the lever that it needed during the next six months.
The Bargaining Process Begins
Working closely with the Commission throughout its Presidency, the UK 
government deliberately devised a "stick and carrot" strategy to persuade the 
reluctant governments of the need to do a deal.
The British had concluded that the Commission's proposals would have little 
practical effect unless the package contained greater provision for new airlines to 
enter the market and also provided existing airlines with the opportunity to fly 
new routes. They recognised, on the other hand, that the inclusion of such 
provisions would radically alter the impact of the package and would make it 
harder for unwilling Member State governments to accept. In consequence, they 
deliberately set out to re-balance the package in two respects, first by reducing 
the scope of the original proposals on fares and capacity sharing arrangements 
and secondly by putting greater emphasis on the Commission's right to exempt 
certain types of inter-airline cooperation from the application of the competition 
rules. The aim was to make the texts on fares and capacity more closely resemble 
existing arrangements, thereby offering Member States a "comfort blanket", and 
at the same time to give assurances that various cooperative arrangements 
between carriers would be safe from action under Article 85 of the Treaty 
(interview with former British civil servant).
Exploiting ECJ Decisions
The value of this assurance was emphasised when the Commission became more 
overtly "militant" in its approach. Exercising its powers under Article 89 the 
Commission overtly "sent letters" to the major European airlines, detailing 
activities which they considered to be contrary to Article 85 and demanding their 
modification or abandonment within the next two months (see Wheatcroft and 
Lipman, 1986, p. 60; McGowan and Seabright, 1989 and Berlin, 1992 for details 
of this action). Clearly, the Commission recognised that it would be impossible 
for the airlines to disengage so quickly from commercial and operational 
relationships developed over many years. In reality, the threat was directed more 
at governments. This was confirmed in a statement by Sutherland, Commissioner 
for Competition:
The decision in the Nouvelles Frontières case will, we hope, fo r  the first time




























































































a recognition that there can be no standing still on liberalisation. We shall 
continue pressing the Commission reform plans fo r air transport but the Court 
decision should force governments to action in this vital area. ■(Sutherland,
1986)
The threats achieved the Commission's desired outcome, at least in the case of the 
French government. The German government also now wanted an agreement but 
it seems less in response to the legal threat than to lobbying by the Chambers of 
Commerce. As Table 3 above shows, Germany depended particularly heavily on 
air transport: its intra-Community traffic grew by 18 per cent between 1979 and 
1987, whilst freight traffic increased by 30 per cent, significantly more than in 
any other Member State.
Thus, by the autumn of 1986 the balance of forces within the Council had 
dramatically changed, with Germany and France joining the United Kingdom and 
the Netherlands in accepting the need for agreement. Recognition of what they 
now saw as inevitable did not imply acceptance of the whole package and hard 
bargaining still lay ahead on issues such as the degree of pricing freedom to be 
allowed to airlines and the scope for multi-designation of airlines on trunk routes. 
However, these problems, although important to all governments, were not the 
main remaining obstacle to agreement. Although four of the smaller Member 
States - Belgium, Ireland, Luxembourg and the newly joined Portugal - had by 
now also indicated their willingness to do a deal, four others - Italy, Greece, 
Denmark and the other new member Spain - were still firmly opposed. 
Paradoxically, their opposition centred not on a Commission proposal but on one 
which had been introduced by the UK Presidency (and which the Commission 
had previously failed to get included in the directive on inter-regional services): 
Community air carriers should have a right, under certain conditions, to operate 
services between Category 1 airports in one country and regional airports in 
another. This was an innovation which at the same time would provide market 
opportunities to airlines which had previously been frustrated by bilateral 
restrictions and would facilitate the development of new business across national 
boundaries.
Italy and Spain based their objections on the inadequacy of existing infrastructure 
to cope with the increased traffic which they feared this innovation would 
generate. They said, however, that they might be able to agree once air traffic 
control systems and facilities at their regional airports had been improved.
Denmark argued differently. All services to its regional airports were provided 
from Copenhagen and passengers flying to or from other countries paid the same 
fare as they would pay to or from the capital. Allowing airlines from other 




























































































had promoted uniform economic development throughout the country; some areas 
would benefit whilst others would not. Greece's opposition straddled these 
positions. It argued that there was no capacity at its two main airports, Athens 
and Thessalonika, to take additional traffic, although like Italy it claimed that 
developments already planned would make this a comparatively short-term 
problem. Its other objection was fundamental. The country's economic 
development depended largely on the provision of year-round air services 
between the mainland and the Greek Islands, yet the traffic was largely seasonal. 
If airlines other than Olympic, the national flag-carrier, were allowed to cream off 
the lucrative summer traffic, it would no longer make the profits necessary to 
offset the heavy losses incurred during the winter months on what were already 
unprofitable routes overall.
Since all four Member States governments said that they were unable to agree, 
and since Article 84(2) of the Treaty required all Council decisions on air 
transport to be taken by unanimity, it appeared that the deadlock would continue. 
The Commission continued to insist that its proposals, including the regional 
airports provision, made a single package and in particular that the granting of 
block exemptions from the competition rules was dependent on an overall 
solution. The other Member State governments, now fearful of the consequences 
of failure, insisted that a way must be found of solving these major problems and 
made it clear that they were ready to settle the other remaining difficulties. The 
circumstances had been created for a solution if the Commission could find a 
means of persuading Italy, Spain, Greece and Denmark to accept.
A Deal is Done
The compromise was that all the airports cited by these four governments would 
be excluded from the regional airports arrangement during the first stage of 
liberalisation (or in the case of the Greek Islands indefinitely), on the 
understanding that further measures would be adopted not later than mid-1990 
find the internal market for air transport completed by 1992.
It was on this basis that agreement was finally reached during the Belgian 
Presidency in 1987, although a last minute dispute between the United Kingdom 
and Spain on the status of Gibraltar airport meant that the package did not take 
effect until the beginning of 1988.
What the Negotiations Achieved
The package finally adopted by the Council of Ministers consisted, as the 




























































































concerning the application of the Competition rules to air transport; a Decision on 
capacity sharing between EC airlines on scheduled intra-Community services and 
on market access to intra-Community routes; and a Directive on fares for 
scheduled air services between Member States (see OJ No L374 of 31.12.1987 
for full texts).
The main features of the measures were as follows:
Fares
(i) "Reference fares7" were to remain subject to approval by the 
aeronautical authorities of the Member States concerned. However, 
the Directive allowed for consultation and, if necessary, arbitration if 
disagreements occurred. Initially the Commission saw no necessity 
to provide for arbitration but those governments which saw it as the 
best available means of blocking opposition to the introduction of 
lower fares insisted upon its inclusion.
(ii) Carriers were given freedom to charge less than the reference fare 
(down to 65% of the fare in a "discount zone" and down to 45% in a 
"deep discount zone") to passengers satisfying certain very 
restrictive conditions. These were deliberately designed to make it 
difficult for business travellers to obtain a cheaper fare, for instance 
by requiring a minimum stay of six nights or over a Saturday night.
The Sharing of Capacity on Intra-Community Services and Carriers' Access to 
Routes between Member States
(i) In any bilateral relationship, the carriers of one of the states 
concerned should be allowed to increase their share of the total 
capacity offered to 55% and to 60% after 1 October 1989. The 
carriers of the other state should have the right to bring their 
capacity into line. The whole process could occur twice.
(ii) However, if the initial move to a 55/45 split led to serious financial 
damage for the carriers providing the lesser share, the Commission 
could veto any further movement. Its decision could be over-turned 
by the Council acting unanimously.




























































































(iii) Every Member State must accept the designation of more than one 
airline by another State to operate between the two countries but 
need not do so on any one route, except where the number of 
passengers carried on that route exceeded a certain threshold 
(250,000 in the first year, reducing in each of the next two years to 
180,000 in year three),
(iv) Subject to the foregoing provisions, EC carriers should be allowed 
to introduce services between Category 1 airports in their own home 
state and a regional airport in another - or vice versa. In such cases, 
a carrier from the other Member State concerned could claim 
reciprocal rights. Any capacity provided by aircraft with not more 
than 70 seats should not be taken into account for the calculations 
made under points (i) and (ii). (These provisions were qualified by 
the exemptions outlined in the preceding section).
(v) In certain closely defined circumstances carriers should be allowed 
to operate fifth freedom servicesS (i.e. services between two 
Member States other than their state of registration) but only where 
such services were operated as an extension of a service from, or a 
preliminary to a service to, their home state.
(vi) The rights conferred under points (iii), (iv) and (v) could be refused 
by a Member State in cases where the airports concerned had 
insufficient facilities to accommodate the proposed services or 
where navigational aids were inadequate.
Application of the Competition Rules
The Council adopted two Regulations. One outlined the procedures for applying 
the competition rules to the air transport sector (but only in respect of 
international transport between EC airports). The second provided for the 
Commission to grant time-limited block exemptions from these rules to certain 
categories of inter-airline agreements and concerted practices.
To a large extent, the first Regulation followed the model established for the other 
sectors of the EC economy, but three points are noteworthy:
(i) The recitals, referring to the "specific features of air transport", 
stated that it would in the first instance be for the undertakings




























































































themselves to ensure that their practices conformed to the rules and 
thus that notification to the Commission "need not be compulsory".
(ii) An annex to the Regulation included a non-exhaustive list of inter­
airline practices which, insofar as their sole objective was to achieve 
"technical improvements or cooperation", were excluded from the 
prohibitions in Article 85(1) of the Treaty.
(iii) The Commission was given the right to fine airlines up to 10% of 
their annual turnover for intentional and negligent infringements of 
the competition rules or for breach of conditions attached to any 
block exemptions which it had granted.
There was much dispute as to what should go into the second Regulation. The 
Commission insisted that it alone had the right to define what types of activity 
should be given block exemptions. Member State governments, wanting time for 
the industry to adapt to more competitive conditions, did not agree. Accordingly, 
they demanded that the regulation should list the types of inter-airline agreement 
to be exempted. Eventually, a compromise was reached whereby the Commission 
agreed to the inclusion of a list but the Member States accepted that the 
Commission alone should define the terms on which the exemptions would be 
granted.
The list specified eight types of activity, including consultations on tariffs and 
conditions of contract; the joint planning and co-ordination of capacity; revenue 
sharing arrangements; and the allocation of landing and take-off slots at 
congested airports. The other were of a more technical nature, e.g. on ground 
handling arrangements.
Significance of the Agreement
The significance of the measures adopted by the Council in December 1987 lies 
less in the immediate changes which they brought to the market place than in their 
considerable transfer of competence from Member State authorities to the 
European Community. This was highlighted by their reaffirmation of the 
European Council's commitment to complete the internal market for air transport 
by 1992 and a recognition that the measures represented only "a first step in this 
direction". The Council accordingly stated that in order to achieve the 1992 
objective it would "adopt further measures o f liberalisation at the end o f a three 
year initial period" (see, for example, the recitals to Council Regulation (EEC) 
No. 3976/87, OJ No. L374 of 31.12.1987, p. 10). Further packages were 




























































































will be removed on 1 April 1997 (see Appendix C for a summary of their 
contents). Meanwhile, a series of complementary measures have also been 
adopted, the most important of which have introduced common rules for the 
operation of computer reservation systems (CRS), for the allocation of slots at 
Community airports and for the payment of denied boarding compensation to 
victims of overbooking. With a few exceptions, notably air traffic control, every 
aspect of the industry's activity is now within the competence of the European 
Community.
Section Five: Conclusions
This paper set out to explore the process whereby competence for air transport 
policy within the EC has been transferred from Member State governments to 
Community institutions and to assess the extent to which the two dominant 
integration theories -intergovemmentalism and modified neo-functionalism - can 
explain why this happened.
Intergovemmentalists argue that the Member State governments are the dominant 
and most powerful players in the integration process. Domestic political 
preferences are therefore reflected in EC policy outcomes and the main purpose 
of the Community is to provide an arena for intergovernmental bargaining. The 
supranational institutions merely follow the preferences of the dominant Member 
State governments, and the speed of progress is determined by the most reluctant 
Member State. If Member State governments do not want integration in a specific 
policy sector, then it will not occur. However, this apparently was not the 
situation in the air transport sector.
The research has shown that a majority of Member State governments were 
content with the status quo, a bilateral system which had existed almost as long 
as the industry itself. In national arenas air transport remained a reserved realm 
based on a socio-politico-economic rationale. Air transport provided public 
services and employment, helped maintain state security and opened a gateway to 
trade and commerce. Unwillingness to change was clearly reflected in the strong 
opposition which thwarted the Commission's first attempts to reform the system 
in 1979 and 1984. Despite continued reluctance by a majority of Member State 
governments the Commission finally succeeded in gaining unanimous agreement 
to a package of liberalising measures which were more far reaching than any 
previously proposed. The findings of this paper thus challenge the postulates of 
intergovemmentalism that Member State governments are in total control of the 
integration process. Their reluctance to change should have been enough to halt 




























































































they were unable to do so. Thus other important variables outside their direct 
control must account for the dynamics of integration in this sector.
The empirical investigation suggests that the three variables upon which modified 
neo-functionalism focuses - transnational activity, EC norms and EC institutional 
action - largely account in this policy sector for the transfer o f control from the 
Member States to the European arena. The research has shown how independent 
transnational actors were instrumental in driving the integration process forward. 
As intra-EC activity - trade, passenger and freight traffic -increased, the 
uncompetitive complex bilateral air transport system became increasingly costly 
and inefficient for the growing number of transactors -major business users, 
private consumers, cargo shippers - who depended for their prosperity upon 
transnational trade. These groups, organised at European level, forged alliances 
with the Commission and worked to make Member State governments recognise 
the need for a supranational policy. Pressure from transnational actors was 
coupled with legal pressure from decisions by the European Court of Justice. 
Whilst intergovemmentalists would recognise the importance of these rulings, 
they would argue that they operate within well defined parameters as mapped out 
by the most powerful and influential Member State governments. However, in 
this instance the rulings were not congruent with the preferences of the larger and 
more powerful Member States, i.e. Germany and France. The Commission made 
use of them in subsequent bargaining between itself and the reluctant Member 
States. Acting autonomously of Member State preferences it also used its powers 
under Article 89 of the Treaty to threaten a unilateral enforcement of the 
competition rules to air transport. Thus, a combination of transnational pressures 
and threats of legal action forced Member State governments to overcome their 
opposition to change.
Analysis of the air transport case shows that in this area at least modified neo­
functionalism provides a better explanation than intergovemmentalism for the 
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EC Classification of Airports Open to Scheduled International Traffic
S ta te A irp o rt A irp o r t  C a teg o ry
Belgium Bruxelles-Zaventem 1
Denm ark Kopenhavn-K astrup/Roskihde 1
W est Germ any Frankfurt/R hein-M ain 1
Dusseldorf-Lohausen 1
M unchen-R iem 1
H am burg-Fuhlsbuttel 2
Stuttgart-Echterdingen 2
Koln/Bonn 2
Greece Atina-H ellinikon 1
T hessaloniki-M icra 1
Spain Palm a-M allorca 1
M adrid-B arajas 1
M alaga 1
Las Palm as 1
Tenerife-Sur 2
Barcelona; Ibiza; A licante; and 
G erona
2
|  France Paris-Charles de G aulle/O rly 1
M arseilles-M arignane 2
N ice-C ote d 'A zur 2
Lyon-Satolas 2
Basle-M ulhouse 2
Republic o f  Ireland Dublin 1
Shannon 1
II Italy R om a-F ium icino/C iam pino 1
M ilano-L inate/M alpensa 1
N apoli-C apodichino 2
V enezia-Tessera 2
C atania-Fontanarossa 2
Luxem bourg Luxem bourg-Findel 2





| U K London-H eathrow /G atw ick/
S tandstead/Luton
1
M anchester-R ingw ay 2
B irm ingham -Elm don 2
G lasgow -A bbotsinch
2I All o ther a irports open to scheduled  international traffic
: _____________________________ 1
(Source: EC Decision on Capacity Sharing and Market Access No 602/87 




























































































Appendix B: Freedoms of the Air
First Freedom: The right to fly over another country without 
landing.
Second Freedom: The right to make a landing for technical reasons 
(e.g. refuelling) in another country without 
picking up/setting down revenue traffic.
Third Freedom: The right to carry revenue traffic from your own 
country (A) to the country (B) of your treaty 
partner.
Fourth Freedom: The right to carry traffic from country B back to 
your own country A.
Fifth Freedom: The right to carry traffic between two other 
countries other than its own.
Sixth Freedom: The use by an airline of country A of two sets of 
third and fourth freedom rights to carry traffic 
between two other countries but using its base at 
A as a transit point.
Seventh Freedom: These rights are also known as cabotage rights. 
The right of airline of country A to carry revenue 
passengers between two points in country B that 
is to say to provide domestic services in a country 
that is not your own.




























































































Appendix C: Liberalisation of the EC Aviation Industry
DEREGULATORY ACTION I st Package 2nd Package 3rd Package
1987 1990 1992
G e o g r a p h i c a l  S c o p e
Regional airports X X X X
Regional/main airports X X X
Main airports X X
Domestic X
T r a f f i c  R i g h t s
Multiple Designation X X X
3-4 Freedoms X X X X
5 Freedom X X X
6 Freedom X X
7 Freedom x<a)
T a r i f f s
Close Relatedness X X X
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